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THE INVISIBLE PRISON: RECONCILING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES OF COERCIVE
TERRY STOPS AND MIRANDA CUSTODY
BROOKE SHAPIRO*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: two policemen, stationed on the side of
a highway in a marked highway patrol car, observe a passing vehicle
driving at an excessive speed. The officers turn on the sirens and lights of
the patrol car and begin to follow the vehicle. The driver immediately pulls
his car over and waits patiently for the police to approach. Once both the
police and the driver's vehicle are parked out of highway traffic, two
officers exit the vehicle and approach the car. Standing at the driver's side
window with their weapons affixed at their hips, the officers request that
the driver turn over his license and registration. Immediately, the driver
reaches into his glove compartment, retrieves the registration and hands
over his license. The officers return to their car to check the vehicle and
driver's information and do not return to the driver's vehicle for
approximately twenty minutes.
The officers run the plates of the vehicle in the database and see that the
driver is the registered owner of the vehicle, there are no liens on the
vehicle, and it has not been reported stolen. Furthermore, the driver's
background check clears without a problem, and he has no violations on his
license nor warrants for his arrest. However, thinking that the driver
somewhat resembles an individual described in a drug-related anonymous
tip, the officers instruct the driver to exit the vehicle with his hands in the
air and to lay face down on the ground. Caught quite off guard and
incredibly confused, he instantly exits the car and acquiesces to their
demands. The officers surround him, place him in handcuffs, and question
him for about twenty minutes while the driver lies face down on the
highway in the prone position. Approximately forty minutes have elapsed
* J.D., June 2010, St. John's University School of Law, B.A., 2008 University of Michigan.
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since the officers initiated the stop. While the police reassure the suspect
that he is not under arrest, his hands are cuffed behind his back and he is
surrounded by two armed police officers who still retain possession of both
his license and registration. Is the suspect "in custody"I for purposes of
Miranda warnings, or is the suspect being subjected to a temporary
detention by police officers, whereby he is free to leave?
In Miranda v. Arizona,2 the Supreme Court held that police may not
interrogate a suspect who has been taken into custody without first advising
the suspect of his rights.3 This case focused on the Fifth Amendment's
protection against self-incrimination by providing a procedural safeguard to
protect suspects from making coerced statements. 4 Two years later, the
Court decided Terry v. Ohio,5 and held that police may temporarily stop
and frisk a suspect for weapons, albeit lacking probable cause to make an
arrest, as long as the police have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
armed or dangerous. 6 The holding in Terry created a narrow exception to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, allowing an officer who "observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude ... that criminal
activity may be afoot" to briefly stop and detain a suspect to dispel
reasonable fear for his own or the safety of others.7
Miranda was initially presented as a bright-line rule to protect suspects
from coerced confessions and self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment. 8 On the other hand, Terry created an exception to the
probable cause requirement for search and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment. 9 Therefore, it seems quite clear that these two distinct
inquiries implicate two different constitutional doctrines and thus mandate
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (requiring that when an individual is taken into
custody, or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way, and subject to
interrogation, he must be clearly informed of his rights, particularly his rights to remain silent, to
consult with a lawyer, and to have a lawyer present during any interrogations).
2 Id
3 Id. at 478-79.
4 Id
5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6 Id. at 30.
7 Id. at 30-31.
8 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ("[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.").
9 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. "[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search
for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime."Id at 27.
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two separate analyses. Moreover, it is of fundamental importance that all
courts understand how Terry and Miranda interact and coexist in order to
adequately protect an individual's constitutional rights.
Courts have struggled to articulate a uniform standard for determining
when, if ever, a Terry stop is also Miranda custody.10 As evidence of this
struggle, the appellate courts are split as to whether certain coercive Terry
stops constitute Miranda custody. 11 The First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
have held that if an investigative stop is reasonable under Terry, then the
suspect is per se not in custody for Miranda purposes.12 The Second,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the Terry reasonableness
standard is irrelevant to determining Miranda custody and that some
reasonably initiated Terry stops may require Miranda warnings before a
further interrogation can proceed. 13 Thus, following the logic of the second
set of courts, a stop can be reasonable under Terry while the suspect is
nevertheless considered to be in custody under Miranda.14 The difference
between these two approaches is monumental. The First Circuit's
approach, operating under the presumption of a Terry reasonableness
standard, overlooks a prophylactic safeguard implemented specifically to
protect against self-incrimination.1 5 While it is difficult to definitively state
10 See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard for resolving Miranda custody challenges); see also United States v. Pelayo-
Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that an individual that was detained and interrogated
by police was not in custody for Miranda purposes); see also United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 976
(9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing the issues of whether a search and seizure were unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment and whether an individual was "in custody" for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment); see also United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 95 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that since
the actions of the police officer during a stop and frisk were justified at its inception, the stop was
permissible under Terry and did not require the administration of Miranda warnings); see also United
States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995) (establishing that because a noncustodial Terry
stop involved a brief detention limited in scope, the officers did not need to provide the suspect with
Miranda warnings); see also United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1473 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that
whether a stop was permissible under Terry is irrelevant to determining Miranda custody); and United
States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "historically, the maximum level of
force permissible in a standard Terry stop fell short of placing the suspect in 'custody' for purposes of
triggering Miranda").
11 Compare Newton, 396 F.3d at 673 (quoting Ali, 68 F.3d at 1472) (focusing on "whether a
reasonable person in defendant's position would have understood himself to be subjected to the
restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest," rather than the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard, for resolving Miranda custody challenges), with Trueber, 238 F.3d at 92
(holding that if an investigatory stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the suspect is not "in
custody" for Miranda purposes).
12 See supra note 10.
13 Id
14 Id
15 See United States v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 63 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasizing that "Terry
stops do not implicate the requirements of Miranda" because "though [they are] inherently somewhat
coercive, [they] do not usually involve the type of police dominated or compelling atmosphere which
necessitates Miranda warnings"); see also Trueber, 238 F.3d at 95 (holding that since the officers'
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the best approach, as they are both tailored to different interests and policy
concerns, the approach taken by the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits most effectively harmonizes the differing interests and protects
individuals' basic constitutional rights.
Part I of this Note details the historic cases that created the legal
landscape for Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Terry created a
narrow exception to the requirement of probable cause; and Miranda
restricted police authority by necessitating procedures to guard against
unwarranted intrusions of constitutionally protected privacy. Part II of this
Note discusses the current circuit split regarding coercive Terry stops and
Miranda custody. Further, it provides a detailed analysis of the differing
perspectives and rationales adopted by the courts. Part III proposes a new
approach to determine when an individual is considered "in custody" for
purposes of Miranda warnings. This Part argues that a Terry inquiry is
separate from a Miranda inquiry, and thus mandates two completely
distinct constitutional analyses. Finally, this note proposes a new
interpretation for reconciling the two doctrines and articulates a broader
definition for the concept of Miranda custody, which is essential to protect
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
I. BACKGROUND
Part I discusses the Miranda and Terry doctrines, as well as the major
Supreme Court cases that have attempted to interpret the collision between
the two.
A. Miranda: The Procedural Safeguard for Fifth Amendment Protection
Miranda16 is the landmark decision that established the well-known
criminal procedure requirement that before engaging a suspect in "custodial
actions during the investigatory stop were "justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place," what occurred was a permissible
Terry stop and, thus, would not mandate the administration of Miranda warnings).
16 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966). The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
a number of cases, decided jointly, in which suspects were questioned while in custody or otherwise
deprived of their freedom in any significant way. In Vignera v. New York, the petitioner was
questioned by police, made oral admissions, and signed an inculpatory statement, all without being
notified of his right to counsel. Similarly, in Westover v. United States, the petitioner was arrested by
the FBI, interrogated, and forced to sign statements without being notified of his right to counsel.
Finally, in California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days without
notifying him of his right to counsel. In all of these cases, suspects were questioned by police officers,
detectives, or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that secluded them from the outside world. None of the
suspects were given Miranda warnings or otherwise informed of their constitutional rights at the outset
of their interrogation.
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interrogations," police officers must inform that suspect of his rights.17
Specifically, that he has the right to remain silent, that any statements he
makes may be used against him at trial, that he has a right to the presence
of counsel during questioning, and that, if he is indigent, an attorney will be
provided to represent him at no cost to the suspect.18
On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his home and taken
into custody and brought to a Phoenix police station. 19 After he was
identified by complaining witnesses, the police escorted him to
"Interrogation Room No. 2," where he was questioned by two officers.20 At
no point was Miranda advised of his rights. 21 After two hours of
interrogation, without an attorney present, the officers exited the room with
a written confession signed by Miranda.22
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, stating
"Miranda was not in any way appraised of his right to consult with an
attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right
not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected . . . ."23
The Court held that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in any significant way, "the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized." 24 Miranda protections were designed
specifically to safeguard suspects from the intimidating and coercive nature
inherent in custodial interrogations that may compel a suspect to become a
witness against himself.25 Thus, any statements obtained without informing
a suspect of his rights are inadmissible in court. 26
17 See id at 478-79; see also Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis
Consequences, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 742 (1999).
18 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; see also Lunney, supra note 17, at 742.
19 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 491-92. One of the officers testified that he read a statement to Miranda informing him
that the "confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promise of immunity and 'with full
knowledge of [his] legal rights, understanding any statement [he made] may be used against [him]."'
However, the officer only did so after Miranda had confessed orally.
23 Id. at 492.
24 Id. at 478. "Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other
fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the
exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation." Id. at 478-79.
25 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; see also GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AM. JUR.: CRIMINAL LAW § 914
(2d ed. 2011).
26 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492 ("Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The
mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had 'full
knowledge' of his 'legal rights' does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to
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Miranda was decided against the backdrop of pervasive
incommunicado interrogations of individuals in police-dominated
environments, which resulted in suspects making self-incriminating
statements without being fully informed of their constitutional rights.27
There is a long lineage of the use of physical brutality and violence in
interrogations that, unfortunately, has not been eviscerated to a remnant of
the past.28 Chief Justice Warren stressed that modern practices of in-
custody interrogations are moving away from the use of physical tactics
and have evolved to more psychologically oriented strategies29 Thus,
acknowledging the potential for abuse of police discretion, the Court
implemented a prophylactic safeguard deliberately intended to protect
against self-incrimination during a custodial interrogation. 30
In Miranda, the Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 31 Before interrogating a suspect, law enforcement officials must first
notify the person of his right to remain silent. 32 If the suspect provides an
effective waiver, by which he clearly articulates that he understands his
rights and wishes to waive them, then he must be warned that "any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 33
This statement of rights was coined Miranda warnings. 34 These warnings
are indispensable to overcome the pressures created by police and to ensure
that the individual is fully informed of his freedom to exercise the Fifth
Amendment privilege. 35
relinquish constitutional rights."); see also BLUM ET AL., supra note 26, at § 914.
27 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445; see also BLUM ET AL., supra note 26, at § 914.
28 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446 ("The use of physical brutality and violence is not, unfortunately,
relegated to the past or to any part of the country.").
29 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (recognizing that coercion can be both mental and physical, and
that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition"); see also Saul
M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 3, 6 (2010).
30 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also Geoffrey B. Fehling, Verdugo, Where'd You Go?: Stoot
v. City of Everett and Evaluating Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Civil Liability Violations, 18
GEO. MASON L. REV. 481, 491-92 (2011).
31 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
32 Id
33 Id.
34 See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (referring to "Miranda warnings"); see also
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1122 (4th ed. 2000) (including
the verb "mirandize," defined as informing a suspect of his or her legal rights).
35 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (creating a protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere
of police or prosecution interrogations); see also Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (finding that Miranda
warnings are required where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him
484
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The Supreme Court analyzed a number of relevant cases discussing
police techniques, and stated that certain police-dominated environments
are created for "no other purpose than to subjugate the individual to the will
of his examiner." 36 This practice is "at odds with one of our Nation's most
cherished principles - that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself."37 Therefore, Miranda was one of many steps taken
by the Court to adequately protect individuals' constitutional rights.
Recognizing the responsibility this requirement would place on law
enforcement officials, the Court stressed that this decision was "not
intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in
investigating crime," but rather to "assure that the individual's right to
choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the
interrogation process." 38
While this decision was momentous, it was not without its
shortcomings. The important safeguard it set forth only specified the
required procedure once a suspect is "in custody." This decision failed to
state indicia of custody or provide a definitive framework for determining
when a suspect can properly be deemed to be "in custody." Since this
decision, some courts have articulated that custody is the functional
equivalent of an arrest, while others require a lesser standard.39 Therefore,
courts have struggled to ascertain the "correct" inquiry, and have arrived,
and will continue to arrive, at varying conclusions on the issue. 40
B. Terry Stops: The Exception to the Fourth Amendment Requirement of
Probable Cause
Two years later, in 1968, the Supreme Court balanced Fourth
Amendment rights with the increasing need of police flexibility to
investigate crimes. 41 Terry established a narrow exception to typical Fourth
Amendment probable cause and warrant requirements by providing police
with limited authority to stop and search a suspect although the officer
lacks probable cause to make an arrest.42 The officer only possesses the
power to take such actions if he has reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
"in custody").
36 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
37 Id. at 457-58.
38 Id. at 469, 477.
39 See supra note 10.
40 Id.
41 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
42 See id. at 30-31; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972).
48 520 12]
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armed, dangerous, or involved in criminal activity.43
In Terry, Officer McFadden, a veteran police officer, was patrolling
downtown Cleveland when he spotted two men acting suspiciously. 44 He
observed one man walk away from the other, and pause for a moment
while looking into a store window. Then, that man walked a short distance
further before turning around and walking back toward the corner to confer
with the other man, pausing briefly in the same spot at the same store
window.45 The two men repeated this ritual approximately twelve times.
After watching the pattern and the exchanges between the two men, the
officer considered it his duty as a police officer to investigate further. 46
Believing that the men were "casing a job, a stick up," McFadden
approached and identified himself as a police officer. 47 When he asked for
their names the men "mumbled something," which heightened Officer
McFadden's suspicion that they were concealing a weapon. He conducted
a brief pat down search and discovered that two of the three men possessed
weapons.48 Officer McFadden brought the suspects to the police station and
they were charged with carrying concealed weapons.49 The defendants
attempted to challenge the evidence's admissibility on the premise that the
officer lacked probable cause, but the Ohio court denied the defendant's
motion. 50 On appeal to the Supreme Court, six justices carved out an
exception to the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement when
exigent circumstances warrant a brief and limited stop and frisk by
police. 51
While no concrete test for determining the reasonableness of
governmental intrusions exists, courts often balance the need for the search
against the invasion the search entails. 52 Using that approach, the Supreme
43 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784 (2009).
44 Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
45 Id. at 6.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 7.
49 Id.
50 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7-8.
51 See id at 25-27 (highlighting that law enforcement officers may stop and frisk a suspect for
weapons if they have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has taken place, is about to take place, or that
the suspect is armed and dangerous).
52 See id. at 20-21 ("[I]t is necessary 'first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,' for there is
'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."') (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.
523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) ("[T]his Court, by
balancing the extent of the intrusion against the need for it, has examined the reasonableness of the
manner in which a search or seizure is conducted.").
486
TEINVISIBLEPERSON
Court focused on balancing the underlying governmental interest justifying
the intrusion with the constitutionally protected interests of the private
citizen.53 Considering the increasing crime rates at that time, crime
prevention and detention were of central interest to the Court's inquiry.
The Court held that a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances, and
in an appropriate manner, approach a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal behavior, even though the officer lacks
probable cause to make an arrest.54
Another important interest for police officers is the ability to take
necessary steps to assure their own personal safety.SS It is a confluence of
these interests that enabled the Court to recognize a limited exception to the
Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause by allowing police to
briefly stop and detain a suspect to dispel reasonable suspicion.56 However,
the Supreme Court did not address whether this on-the-scene inquiry
implicated the Miranda warnings that the Court implemented two years
earlier.57 In light of this omission, courts have been reluctant to require
Miranda warnings during Terry stops. 58 However, subsequent to this
decision, federal courts have significantly expanded the initially narrow
scope of the Terry exception.59 Many highly intrusive forms of force that
were once prohibited under Terry are now common and routine. For
instance, handcuffing detainees, pointing guns at detainees, and placing
suspects in police cars are now procedures that are considered permissible
under Terry.60 Many commentators have stated that judges should require
53 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
54 See id. at 22 (recognizing the increasing importance of crime prevention and protection for law
enforcement officials while in the field).
55 See id. at 24 ("[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where that may lack probable cause
for an arrest."); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("The Court recognized in Terry
that the policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to
protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect.").
56 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
57 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (highlighting that the Supreme Court has
not required Miranda warnings for a non-coercive Terry stop encounter).
58 See id; see also United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that
most Terry stops do not require Miranda warnings).
59 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (stating that "[n]o judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety
of the street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case before us"); see also Adams, 407
U.S. at 147 (holding that reasonable cause for a Terry stop can be based on information provided by a
third-party).
60 See United States v. Leshuk, 63 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the use of
handcuffs, the employment of firearms, the placement of a suspect in a police vehicle, and the use of
force or threat of force during a Terry stop does not automatically alter the nature of the stop to require
Miranda warnings); see also United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the display of firearms or use of handcuffs does not turn a lawful Terry stop into an arrest); see also
United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1095 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the use of handcuffs does not
2012] 487
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Miranda warnings when the coercion employed by police establishes
custody. While this increased force may be acceptable under Terry 's
broadened scope, it may simultaneously compel self-incrimination.6' Thus,
the expansive revolution of Terry has created extensive judicial discord as
to what constitutes appropriate police conduct and criminal procedure. 62
C. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions Attempting to Reconcile Miranda
and Terry
Two years before the Court decided Terry, it articulated a definition of
"Miranda custody" and ruled that a person has been taken into police
custody whenever he has been "deprived of his freedom by the authorities
in any significant way."63 Because this definition was vague and provided
little guidance to lower courts, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
concept in a series of subsequent cases. 64 The Court addressed the
relationship between Fourth and Fifth Amendment concepts yet again in
California v. Beheler.65 While the facts were incredibly distinct from
Miranda, it was the perfect opportunity for the Court to refine the Miranda
holding with respect to the issue of custody. The Court narrowed the
transform a legal Terry stop into an arrest); see also United States v. Hemphill, No. 84-5645, 1985 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14371, at *13 (6th Cir. June 3, 1985) (maintaining that requiring suspects to lie on the
ground in handcuffs is appropriate in some Terry stops); and United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709
(9th Cir. 1983) (determining that handcuffing and frisking a suspect is permissible during a Terry stop).
61 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (concluding that the need for increased
force during investigative stops caused by public safety concerns is more important than protecting the
privilege against self-incrimination); see also United States v. Jones 567 F.3d 712, 717 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(stating that some police questions are allowed without requiring Miranda warnings under the public
safety exception, even though those questions may violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination).
62 Compare Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1983) (opining that the detention of a man in
an airport while officers searched his suitcases exceeded limits allowed for Terry stops), with United
States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that because police officers were
concerned about their personal safety, drawing firearms did not elevate the investigatory stop to an
arrest requiring Miranda warnings); see Harvard Law Review Ass'n, Recent Cases: Criminal Law -
Exclusionary Rule - Tenth Circuit Holds Miranda Warnings Applicable to Terry Stops - United States
v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993), 107 HARV. L. REv. 1831, 1831 (1994) ("Recently, however, as
courts have authorized increasingly intense police coercion under Terry, commentators have argued that
judges should require Miranda warnings when the coercion applied during a stop establishes custody.").
63 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
64 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 326 (1994) (determining that a police officer's
undisclosed opinion of an individual as a suspect has no bearing on the determination of whether that
individual was in custody); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438-40 (1984) (holding that
an individual detained under a reasonable Terry stop need not be informed of his Miranda rights due to
the brief, non-intrusive nature of Terry stops); and California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)
(recognizing that all of the circumstances surrounding an interrogation must be used to determine if an
individual is in custody, but concluding that "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal
arrest or restraint of freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest") (quoting
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
65 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
THELVVISIBLEPERSON
analysis by stating that "the ultimate inquiry [when determining whether a
suspect is in custody] is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." 66
While Beheler provided some clarity, it did not completely dispel the
confusion. In 1984, the Court decided Berkemer v. McCarty, effectively
redefining the concept of custody yet again. Berkemer established an
objective test for determining whether a suspect was "subjected to
restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest." This
decision stated "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
suspect's position would have understood his situation." 67 Thus, in
Berkemer, the Court held that routine traffic stops do not automatically
trigger a suspect's Miranda rights.68
However, the Berkemer decision is best understood within in its
historical context. The case predates the vast expansion of Terry stops,
since the modem, highly intrusive Terry stop did not exist in 1984 when
this case was decided. Rather, at that time Terry stops were considered to
be brief, non-intrusive detentions to confirm or dispel reasonable suspicion.
To fully understand the holding, analyzing the facts of Berkemer is
useful. Berkemer was pulled over for weaving in and out of traffic on an
interstate highway.69 The officer approached the car and asked Berkemer to
exit his vehicle. 70 Observing Berkemer struggle significantly to maintain
his balance while standing, the officer asked Berkemer if he had been using
any intoxicants, to which Berkemer replied, "he had consumed two beers
and smoked several joints of marijuana a short time before." 71 Thereafter,
the officer formally placed Berkemer under arrest and drove him in a patrol
car to the police station.72
The Supreme Court focused on two features of ordinary traffic stops to
reach its ultimate holding.73 First, the detention of a motorist pursuant to a
traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief.74 Second, the Court
66 Id. at 1125 (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
67 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
68 See id. at 439-40 (stating that there is a non-coercive nature to ordinary traffic stops that
prompts the Court to hold "that persons temporarily detained pursuant to [Terry] ... stops are not 'in
custody' for the purposes of Miranda").
69 Id. at 423.
70 Id
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 437.
74 See id at 437-38 ("The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A
motorist's expectations .. . are that he will be obliged to spend a short period time answering questions
and waiting while the officer checks his license . . . . In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary
traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation . . . .").
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emphasized the fact that traffic stops are not as police-dominated or
coercive as custodial interrogations that provoke Miranda warnings. 75
While this argument is certainly valid for this specific Terry stop, the
context surrounding this decision has significantly changed and
transformed how this principle should apply.
The Court viewed the routine traffic stop in Berkemer as representative
of all Terry stops - an assumption that sweeps too broadly given the
evolution of modem Terry stops. While this decision was fitting for its
time, the scope of Terry stops has significantly expanded beyond the
contours that the Court envisioned when it decided Berkemer. In reaching
this holding, it is evident that the Court imagined a Terry stop as it was
originally created by the Terry decision in 1968, and not as the reality that
exists today.76 Simply stated, the Berkemer decision did not address the,
now ever so pervasive, highly intrusive Terry stop simply because it did not
exist at that time. 77
Most recently, the Supreme Court decided Stansbury v. California and
affirmed that the objective test is the appropriate analysis for custody
determinations. 78 The case stands for the principle that while the officer's
subjective beliefs are relevant "to the extent they would affect how a
reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would
gauge the breadth of his or her 'freedom of action,"' 79 their beliefs are but
one of many factors in the retrospective totality of the circumstances
approach. The Court stated that the "weight and pertinence of any
communications regarding the officer's degree of suspicion will depend
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 80
75 See id. at 438-39 (noting that "circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such
that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police," and since the traffic stop is conducted in
public view, there is a substantially reduced ability for the police to employ illegitimate tactics to
provoke a self-incriminating statement).
76 See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that the last few
decades have experience a multifaceted expansion of the initial Terry exception, specifically with
respect to the wildly permissive amount of police force used during Terry stops); see also Mark A.
Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715,
739 (1994) (explaining that "it is clear that the Supreme Court was envisioning a Terry stop as a brief
encounter, without the use of handcuffs or weapons, where the officer merely frisks the suspect and/or
asks him a few questions relating to his identity and the suspicious circumstances").
77 See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463; Godsey, supra note 76, at 739 ("[T]he Berkemer Court did not
address that issue because the highly intrusive Terry stops that are common today did not exist then.").
78 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (holding that the initial determinations of custody depends on the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views of the police).
79 Id. at 325.
80 Id. Since this approach is incredibly time consuming, mandates a very fact specific inquiry, and
places the burden of conducting a hefty balancing test on the courts, Part III of this Note provides a new
test for determining custody that should relieve some of the pressure from both the police and the
courts.
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In considering what a reasonable person would understand, courts
analyze the totality of the circumstances in making custody determinations.
To determine whether the detention was an arrest or the functional
equivalent of an arrest, courts typically consider any combination of the
following factors: 1) location; 2) number of officers questioning the
suspect; 3) degree of physical restraint used to detain the suspect; 4)
duration and character of the interrogation; 5) language used to summon
the suspect; and 6) whether the suspect initiated contact with the police.
This list is not exhaustive and no one factor or group of factors is
dispositive. Therefore, courts face much adversity in determining custody,
as evidenced by the current circuit split.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Courts have struggled to articulate a uniform standard for the
relationship between Terry stops and Miranda custody. Thus, appellate
courts are split as to whether some coercive Terry stops may constitute
Miranda custody. The First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have held that if
an investigative stop is reasonable under Terry, then the suspect is per se
not in custody for Miranda purposes. 81 However, the Second, Seventh,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the Terry reasonableness standard
is irrelevant to determining Miranda custody and that Terry stops may
require Miranda warnings before a further interrogation can proceed. 82 The
distinctions between these two approaches are quite significant because the
first set of circuits overlook a necessary procedural safeguard implemented
to protect against self-incrimination. This Part explains the differing
perspectives and rationales for the arguments on both sides of the circuit
split.
81 See United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that a suspect is
not in custody when an investigative stop is reasonable); see also United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79,
92 (1st Cir. 2001) (using Terry reasonableness to determine whether Miranda custody is implicated);
and United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that if a stop is justified and
reasonable under Terry, then the suspect is not in Miranda custody).
82 See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004) (mandating that a Terry analysis
not be utilized to determine if a suspect is "in custody" for purposes of Miranda); see also United States
v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that under the totality of the circumstances the
suspect would not have felt free to leave, and therefore was in custody for Miranda purposes); see also
United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1473 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that whether a stop is permissible
under Terry is irrelevant to determining Miranda custody); see also United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d
1088, 1097 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment analysis is much narrower and gives
police officers much less discretion than in a Fourth Amendment analysis); and United States v. Perdue,
8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993) (positing that even a reasonable Terry stop can require Miranda warnings
once the police use excessive, coercive force).
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A. Approach #1: IfA Stop is Reasonable Under Terry, It Automatically
Does Not Constitute Custody Under Miranda
The First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have held that because reasonable
Terry stops are by definition non-custodial, no overlap exists between
Terry and Miranda.83 Under this approach, Terry stops can grow
increasingly coercive without ever requiring Miranda warnings. 84 The
Fourth Circuit offers a clear example of this interpretation. 85 In United
States v. Leshuk, the court reasoned that "the perception ... that one is not
free to leave is insufficient to convert a Terry stop into an arrest." 86
Refusing to enable a suspect's reasonable belief that he was in custody to
transform a Terry stop into Miranda custody, the court determined that
since the deputies acted within the ambit of a permissible Terry stop, their
actions were justified and not subject to a Miranda analysis. 87
In Leshuk, Steve Leshuk and Glen Smith were found in the woods and
cornered by police after officers discovered chicken wire enclosing thirty-
three marijuana plants.88 The deputies identified themselves as police,
frisked the defendants, and determined that they were not armed or
dangerous. 89 Informing the defendants that they were investigating a
nearby marijuana site, they questioned the defendants about their purpose
in the woods. 90 Neither defendant answered.9 1 Questioning continued, but
at no point were Miranda rights read. After a series of questions, one
defendant attempted to run from the police. Only then was he read his
rights, and placed in a police car.92
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit relied extensively on the
Berkemer assessment of Terry stops. The court stated that "a noncustodial
Terry stop involves a brief [but complete] detention of liberty;" 93 and the
officers in this case did not need to reduce the intensity of their efforts
83 See United States v. Young, No. 4:02-CR-7, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28617, at *16 (E.D. Mo.
Apr. 9, 2002); see also United States v. Alvarado-Rodriguez, 59 F. Supp. 2d 329, 331 (D.P.R. 1999);
see also Smith v. Maryland, 974 A.2d 991, 1008-09 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007); and Katherine M.
Swift, Drawing a Line Between Terry and Miranda: The Degree and Duration of Restraint, 73 U. CH.
L. REv. 1075, 1075-76 (2006).
84 See Swift, supra note 83, at 1075.
85 SeeLeshuk, 65 F.3d at 1105.
86 Id. at 1109 (quoting United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cit. 1987)).
87 Id. at 1109-10
88 Id. at 1107.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1007.
92 Id.
93 Id.atlll0.
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because this was a limited Terry stop that was reasonable to protect their
safety.94 The Fourth Circuit relied on the premise that "Terry stops differ
from custodial interrogation in that they must last no longer than necessary
to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion." 95 The court concluded that
"drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol car
for questioning, or using or threatening to use force does not necessarily
elevate a lawful stop into a custodial arrest for Miranda purposes." 96
The First and Eighth Circuits have similarly held that reasonable Terry
stops mean that the detention is not custodial. 97 Using the legal framework
set forth in Berkemer, the First Circuit, in United States v. Trueber,
acknowledged that while Terry stops are inherently somewhat coercive,
they do not entail the same type of police-dominated, compelling
atmosphere that mandates Miranda warnings.98 Trueber did recognize that
a Terry stop could escalate to a de facto arrest, at which point it would
cease to be a valid Terry stop and would require Miranda warnings.
However, based on the specific facts of that case, the First Circuit held that
the stop of the defendants was a valid Terry stop that did not transform into
a de facto arrest necessitating the administration of Miranda warnings.99
This group of courts has held that a reasonable detention is necessarily
noncustodial and thus has declined to analyze the coercive police behavior
during the stop. The constitutional inquiry stops short at the Fourth
Amendment and does not address Miranda Fifth Amendment concerns.
These courts analyze "whether 'the officer['s] actions were justified at
[their] inception,' and if so," then the stop is a reasonable Terry stop
regardless of its intensity and duration. 100 Therefore, these courts agree that
if a stop is reasonable when initiated, it automatically does not implicate
Miranda warnings.
94 Id. at 1109 ("As a general rule, officers conducting a Terry stop are authorized to 'take such
steps as [are] reasonable necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the statute quo during
the course of the stop."') (quoting United States v. Hensley, 496 U.S. 221, 235 (1985)).
95 Id. at 1109.
96 Id.atll09-10.
97 See generally Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1109-10.; see also United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 95
(1st Cir. 2001).
98 See Trueber, 238 F.3d at 95 (rejecting the defendant's Miranda challenge during a Terry stop in
which the police drew weapons and forced the defendant to place his hands over his head, because
where the Terry search falls short of an arrest, Miranda warnings are not required).
99 See id. at 93 (detailing the two-step inquiry set forth in determining whether Trueber was in
custody when he was questioned by detectives after the police stopped his truck).
100 Id. at 92 (quoting United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 748 (1st Cir. 1999)).
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B. Approach #2: Terry Reasonableness is Irrelevant To Determine
Miranda Custody
The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have consistently held
that even if a Terry stop is reasonable, a suspect may still be in custody for
Miranda purposes, if coercive conduct is employed. 01 Unlike the first set
of appellate courts, this group has held that a coercive stop, while valid
under Terry, may nevertheless still require Miranda warnings.
In United States v. Ali, the Second Circuit held that whether a stop is
reasonable under Terry is irrelevant to the Miranda doctrine because
"Terry is an 'exception' to the Fourth Amendment probable cause
requirement, not the Fifth Amendment protections against self-
incrimination."l 02 In Ali, a customs inspector at John F. Kennedy Airport in
New York City was conducting a routine x-ray examination of luggage
when he discovered shotguns in baggage checked under the defendant's
name. Seven customs officials, five in uniform with visible weapons,
approached the defendant for questioning. He was thereafter isolated,
surrounded by customs officials and bombarded with questions. After
intense questioning, he admitted that his luggage contained shotguns. He
was thereafter arrested and brought to the customs building where he was
read his Miranda rights for the first time. The Second Circuit remanded
the case to the lower court with instructions to follow the proper inquiry:
"whether a reasonable person in Ali's shoes would have felt free to leave
under the circumstances."1 03
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Smith, adopted the same
reasoning and found that the "inquiry into the circumstances of temporary
detention for a Fifth . .. Amendment Miranda analysis requires a different
focus than that for a Fourth Amendment Terry stop."1 04 Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit has stated, "whether an individual detained during the
execution of a search warrant has been unreasonably seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes and whether the individual is 'in custody' for
Miranda purposes are two different issues."105 In United States v. Perdue,
101 See supra note 82.
102 United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1473 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The fact that the seizure and search of
a suspect comports with the Fourth Amendment under Terry simply does not determine whether the
suspect's contemporaneous oral admissions may be used against him or her at trial. A Terry stop may
turn into a custodial detention."); see United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 494 (2d Cir. 1991) ("If the
intrusion becomes excessive, it ceases to be a Terry type detention that can be justified based on
reasonable suspicion and instead becomes a seizure that requires a showing of probable cause.").
103 Ali, 68 F.3d at 1473.
104 United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1096 (7th Cir. 1993).
105 United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2002).
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the Tenth Circuit held that while a stop where an individual was detained at
gunpoint, handcuffed, and questioned for forty-five minutes was
reasonable, the suspect was nonetheless placed in Miranda custody, and
thus should have been read his Miranda rights.106
The Second Circuit clearly articulated that the test for determining when
an accused is in custody is "whether a reasonable person in the defendant's
position would have understood himself to be 'subjected to the restraints
comparable to those associated with a formal arrest."' 10 7 Furthermore,
"[a]n accused is in 'custody' when, in the absence of an actual arrest, law
enforcement officials act or speak in a manner than conveys the message
that they would not permit the accused to leave." 08
In United States v. Newton, the Second Circuit held that a suspect who
was seized by police, handcuffed and questioned at length in his apartment,
was subject to a custodial interrogation by police, despite the fact that he
was not subject to a formal arrest. While the court found that the suspect
was in custody for Miranda purposes, Judge Raggi concluded that the stop
did not amount to a Miranda violation, despite being in Miranda custody
without being read his rights, because the officer's actions fell within the
public safety exception. 109 Therefore, unless police conduct is justified by
the public safety exception, some coercive Terry stops require Miranda
warnings before further questioning can proceed.
III. RECONCILING THE MIRANDA AND TERRY DOCTRINES
This Note considers the interplay of Miranda and Terry and proposes a
new definition for custody that will provide adequate protection to
individuals subject to intrusive and/or coercive stops. This Note does not
advocate a return of the Terry doctrine to its pre-expansion dimensions.
Rather, this new approach seeks to broaden the definition for Miranda
custody to coincide with the more expansive, and often psychologically
coercive, Terry stops that are permissible today. Therefore, this broader
definition is consistent with the central concern of Miranda, which is to
protect a suspect from the psychological pressures inflicted by police.
106 United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that because any person in
Perdue's position would have felt that they were at the mercy of the police, he was deemed to be in
custody at the time that he was interrogated).
107 Ali, 68 F.3d at 1472 (quoting United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1994)).
108 Id. (quoting Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1021 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989)).
109 United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677-78 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that because there was a
concern for the existence of weapons in the home, as well as a record of violence, the officers werejustified in delaying Miranda wamings under the public safety exception).
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Further, this Part critiques the two different approaches the circuit courts
have taken by highlighting fallacies in the support, policy, and ultimate
conclusion of each.
A. Fallacies of Current Approaches and Misplaced Reliance on Berkemer
Approach #1 is not the appropriate inquiry because it is based on an
outdated premise that Terry stops are minimally brief intrusions. The First,
Fourth, and Eighth Circuit have incorrectly used a Terry analysis to
determine if Miranda was implicated, instead of first addressing the Fourth
Amendment concerns, and then addressing Miranda under the Fifth
Amendment. These courts rely heavily on Berkemer; however, Berkemer
was decided in 1984, which predates the federal courts' expansion of the
Terry doctrine in the early 1990's.
Relying on Berkemer, the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits hold that the
reasonableness of a stop and frisk permitted under Terry precludes the
necessity of Miranda considerations, even during particularly intrusive
stops.11 0 This approach effectively diminishes a defendant's ability to
invoke Miranda protections during any type of Terry stop. The courts'
reference to Berkemer's classification of Terry stops as nonthreatening, and
thus not invoking Miranda, is inapplicable, as the scope of Terry has
expanded beyond what Berkemer describes. While the analysis in
Berkemer is correct in its dealings with routine traffic stops, those stops are
by their nature very different and unique."'
Presently, certain practices that were not permissible under Terry are
commonplace and routine. For instance, handcuffing detainees, pointing
guns, and placing a suspect in the back of a police car are all acceptable
under the expansive Terry doctrine that exists today. Relying on the legal
support of Berkemer, courts have declared "[n]o Miranda warning is
necessary for persons detained for a Terry stop."12 The Eighth Circuit
rejected the contention that an individual is in custody whenever a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave, and instead concluded,
110 See supra Part II.A.
Ill See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-39 (1984) (distinguishing traffic stops by noting
that they only last a few minutes, the questioning is brief and limited in scope, they are visible to the
public, and they are limited to one or two police officers); see also Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct.
1213, 1224 (2010) (identifying a traffic stop as temporary and relatively nonthreatening).
112 United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592-93 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent's conduct during a Terry stop did not curtail the defendant's
freedom to the degree associated with a formal arrest, and thus the defendant was not entitled to
Miranda warnings prior to his arrest).
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"most Terry stops do not trigger the detainee's Miranda rights."l' 3 While
this logic was historically true, it, like Berkemer, ignores the recent
expansion of the exception to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It fails to
consider the Terry stops that are so oppressive in nature that they function
to detain the suspect in the same manner as a custodial interrogation.
The Tenth Circuit readily distinguished Berkemer and outlined why
reliance on that case is misplaced.l 14 The court stressed that Berkemer was
decided at a time when Terry stops were considered to be brief, non-
intrusive encounters. 115 When the Supreme Court reached its holding in
Berkemer, the Court was envisioning a Terry stop as mandated by Terry v.
Ohio. The holding cannot be interpreted to support the proposition that
Miranda is inapplicable to Terry stops as they frequently occur today. The
Court was unable to address the new confines of Terry simply because at
the time of the Berkemer decision they did not exist.11 6 Therefore, the First,
Fourth, and Eighth Circuits' reliance on Berkemer as the backbone of their
approach is without merit.
While the approach of the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits provides a
bright line rule, which is quite easy for police to follow and use to govern
their conduct, privacy rights and basic civil rights are significantly
impaired, if not completely sacrificed, under this rule. If this view were to
prevail in future cases, it would open a Pandora's box for abuse of police
discretion. If courts fail to recognize a distinction between Terry stops and
coercive Terry stops, courts will grant the police unfettered discretion to
use whatever means they please to stop and detain suspects. Under this
view, there is a great risk that police will interrogate suspects using
coercive measures, without probable cause, and without administering
Miranda safeguards.]17
113 Id. (emphasis added) (stating that "[o]ne is not free to leave a Terry stop until the completion of
a reasonably brief investigation, which may include limited questioning").
114 See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1466 (1993) (distinguishing the Terry stop that
occurred in that case from the routine traffic stops described in Berkemer, and explaining the essential
differences between the two).
115 See id. at 1465.
116 See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40; see also Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464 ("[H]istorically, the
maximum level of force permissible in a standard Terry stop fell short of placing the suspect in
'custody' or purposes of triggering Miranda. This fact led the Court to announce in Berkemer, 'the
comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion
in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.") (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at
440). This case was decided in 1984. Since this decision, police authority during Terry encounters has
been significantly expanded and applied to a number of situations that would have been unacceptable
under Terry as the Court decided it in 1968.
117 See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464 (describing a scenario where police officers drew guns on the
defendant and interrogated him without reading him his Miranda rights); see also Godsey, supra note
76, at 736-37 (discussing the risks of providing the police with wide, unchecked discretion to conduct
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Other courts have rejected Approach #1 because the approach is out of
sync with the current reality of Terry stops. Thus, these courts created
Approach #2 to better address the interplay between Terry and Miranda.
While this Note agrees with the constitutional inquiry and reconciliation of
Terry and Miranda in Approach #2, this Note disagrees that a coercive stop
requiring Miranda warnings can still be deemed reasonable under Terry.
In order to avoid compromising either constitutional doctrine implicated in
these types of encounters, courts should require Miranda warnings in
coercive Terry stops.
Allowing a Terry stop to rise to the level of Miranda custody while
remaining a valid Terry stop defies the very purpose and existence of the
limited Terry doctrine. Reaching that conclusion would essentially enlarge
Terry to the point that it sanctions custodial interrogations. The Supreme
Court never contemplated such a conclusion when it decided Terry or
Miranda.118 It acknowledged, "a search which is reasonable at its inception
may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and
scope."l 19 In Terry, the Supreme Court stressed that police-conducted stop
and frisks, "[are] serious intrusion[s] upon the sanctity of the person, which
may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment," and should not
be undertaken lightly.120 The language utilized by the Court clearly
emphasized that Terry stops were supposed to be a narrow exception to the
requirement of probable cause, strictly circumscribed, and authorized only
in rare and limited scenarios. On numerous occasions, the Court stressed
that Terry stops must be "limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others
nearby."l 2 1 "If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to
determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry. . . ."122
Since the Terry doctrine has undergone a substantial transformation that
Terry stops without Miranda warnings).
118 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (neglecting to discuss the interplay
between Miranda warnings and Terry stops); see also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (disregarding
respondent's concern that "'exempt[ing]' traffic stops from the coverage of Miranda will open the way
to widespread abuse"); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968) (explaining that a search for
weapons, which are not supported by probable cause, must be supported by the exigency which
permitted the search).
119 Terry, 392 U.S. at 18, 19 ("The scope ofthe search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.").
120 Id. at 15, 17 ("[C]ourts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct
which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the objective
evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be
condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.").
121 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26).
122 Id.
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significantly enlarged police authority, courts must broaden the definition
of "custody" to proportionately coincide with the broader Terry. This more
flexible standard will provide parallel constitutional protection to
individuals' liberties. Therefore, if a coercive Terry stop mandates
Miranda warnings to protect a suspect against self-incrimination, that stop
can no longer be deemed reasonable under Terry without issuing Miranda
warnings.123 A stop can, at its inception, be reasonable under Terry,
however, once that stop rises to a level that requires the procedural
safeguards of Miranda, it is removed from the ambit of the Terry analysis
and must then be analyzed under Miranda.124
B. The Proper Inquiry for Reconciling Terry Stops and Miranda Custody
While courts currently struggle to reach a consensus on a uniform test
for determining custody, the problem is not created by the test, but rather
with the standard being applied. In Berkemer, the Court held that the
ultimate basis for Miranda custody was whether a reasonable person in the
suspect's position would have concluded that he was under arrest or subject
to the functional equivalent of an arrest. 125 Given the federal courts' recent
expansion of Terry, it is useful to conceptually consider the Terry doctrine
in two categories: traditional-Terry and modern-Terry. Traditional-Terry
consists of Terry stops as they were initially contemplated under Terry, as
brief detentions to dispel or confirm reasonable suspicion. Modem-Terry,
on the other hand, pertains to the highly intrusive and forceful stops that are
now routinely employed by police.
While the standard from Berkemer may be applicable under traditional-
Terry, given the extensive development of the permissible force in Terry
encounters, modern-Terry mandates a different standard for custody. For
purposes of Miranda, "custody" is limited to a formal arrest or restraint of
freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest. 126 The
current standard for custody fails to provide citizens with the protections
123 See Swift, supra note 83, at 1088 (stating that, "[a] constitutional approach would be to require
the Miranda warnings in such [coercive] situations, but also to emphasize that when a Terry stop
becomes custodial, it is no longer a valid Terry stop .... ); see also United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d
79, 93 (1st Cir. 2001).
124 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 ("This Court has held in the past that a search which is reasonable at
its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.").
125 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (emphasizing that the focus should be on how
a "reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.").
126 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966); see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 495 (1977) (requiring Miranda warnings only where there has been a restriction on a person's
freedom as to render him in custody).
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from psychological pressures imposed by law enforcement in police-
dominated environments, and specifically in coercive Terry stops.
The appropriate standard for defining custody to protect suspect's
constitutional rights would consider whether a suspect is restrained in a
way associated with a formal arrest or subject to the pressures of a
coercive, police-dominated environment. This new rule is in line with the
basic principles of Miranda, the Fifth Amendment, and the underlying
public policy considerations. 127 The Fifth Amendment provides that no
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . ."128 It has long been held that this prohibition permits a
suspect not to answer "official questions put to him in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."l 29 In all proceedings of
this nature, "a witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to
answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his
compelled answers" in a subsequent case where he is the defendant. 130
Without such protections, a suspect can be coerced into make self-
incriminating statements. 131 In reaching the Miranda holding, the Supreme
Court was concerned with the psychological pressures a suspect faces that
may provoke him to make self-incriminating statements. Ruling that
Miranda warnings are required when a suspect is in custody before
interrogation can be initiated, the Court acknowledged that when "normal
procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to
deceptive stratagems . . . ."132 Therefore, the Court tried to protect a
suspect's constitutional rights by requiring police to notify him of his rights
before interrogation.
While this approach may appear to place the burden on police, it still
provides for a public safety exception, as articulated in Quarles v. New
York. 133 Police may dispense with the warnings requirement when there is
127 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (expressing a concern for protecting a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination); see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100 (1975)
(discussing the guidelines Miranda established to protect a person's constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination).
128 U.S. CONST. amend V.
129 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
130 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
131 See id.; see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 768 (2003) ("We have also recognized that
governments may penalize public employees and government contractors . . . to induce them to respond
to inquiries, so long as the answers elicited (and their fruits) are immunized from use in any criminal
case against the speaker.").
132 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455; see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) (discussing the
use of "psychological ploys" as techniques of persuasion during interrogations).
133 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (holding that "there is a 'public safety' exception to the requirement
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an overwhelming concern for public safety.134 If the state can prove that a
public safety threat warranted a delay of Miranda warnings, then the new
standard, which requires Miranda warnings in police-dominated
atmospheres, would not apply. 135
This approach to defining custody comports with the principles and
concerns that the Court initially addressed in Miranda.136 While Miranda
did hold that a suspect is in custody when they are detained in the form of
an arrest, or the functional equivalent of an arrest, the courts now confront
cases that are not quite an arrest, but significantly curtail the suspect's
freedom in such a manner that they would not be permitted to leave without
obstructing justice. Therefore, the current standard for custody is no longer
adequate to protect the basic tenets of the Miranda decision.' 37
C. Standard Suite - Illustrations ofDiffering Perspectives
1. Hypo #1 - An Example of Traditional-Terry
Police responding to an anonymous tip, regarding drug trafficking and
illegal activity, follow a car that fits the informant's description. A police
car follows the vehicle down a service road and stops behind the car at a
dead end. A uniformed officer exits the vehicle and approaches the
suspect's car. He requests the driver's license and registration information.
Noticing a concealed object in the suspect's jacket pocket, the officer
requests that the suspect exit the vehicle, to enable the officer to perform a
brief pat down search. During the search, the officer questions the suspect
about his presence in the area and his ultimate destination. The suspect
willingly answers the officer's questions and at all times complies and
acquiesces with the officer's demands.
Under Approach #1, a court would conclude that the suspect was not
entitled to the safeguards prescribed by Miranda, because his freedom of
action was not curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answer may be admitted into evidence"); see also
United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying the public safety exception).
134 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655; see United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 612 (2005)
(acknowledging the public safety exception's function to ensure the safety of police officers).
135 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655.
136 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (stressing that the psychologically oriented aspects of modem
interrogations must be curtailed to protect a suspect's constitutional rights so as to not buckle under the
pressure and make self-incriminating statements).
137 Id. at 447 (stating that the Miranda decision was a necessary limitation upon custodial
interrogations that was essential to ensure that coercive practices are eradicated in the foreseeable
future); see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1976) (referring to Miranda warnings as a "critical
safeguard").
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Following this approach, a court would emphasize that the suspect
voluntarily complied with the officer's demands and willingly continued
the conversation about his purpose and presence in the area. Courts that
adopt this approach believe that Terry stops that are initiated reasonably are
not custodial. Therefore, under this approach, the stop would be deemed
reasonable under Terry and thus would not require warnings.
Under Approach #2, a court would separate the two different
constitutional inquiries, and explain that inquiry into the "circumstances of
temporary detention for a Fifth and Sixth Amendment Miranda analysis
requires a different focus than that for a Fourth Amendment Terry stop."1 38
A court using this approach would analyze the police-dominated
environment and focus on certain coercive aspects of this detention. This
approach allows courts to protect suspects who are victims of stops that
move away from what is a reasonable Terry stop to the more modern forms
of detention that are permissible today. Thus, this stop may be deemed
reasonable under Terry, but could also compel warnings under Miranda if
it rose to a coercive level. However, given the facts of this hypothetical, it
is likely that a court would find this encounter to be the epitome of a
"traditional-Terry" stop. Since it lacks indicia of police-dominated
coercion, it would not require Miranda warnings. However, the
importance of this approach is that it separates the two different
constitutional analyses, providing the necessary prophylactic safeguards to
guard against a violation of a suspect's Fourth and/or Fifth Amendment
rights.
Under this new approach, a court would have a more flexible standard
for determining whether a suspect was in Miranda custody. The new
standard allows the court to decide if a suspect was subject to an arrest, the
functional equivalent of an arrest, or a detention that significantly restricts
the suspect's freedom of movement, and forces the suspect to submit to
coercive police pressures without rising to the level of a full-blown arrest.
Under this approach, a court would not be confined to a narrow definition
of custody, and would be able to adequately assess the important elements
of coercion. Therefore, a court utilizing this approach would likely
determine that Miranda warnings would not be required since there was no
coercive police pressure.
138 United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1096 (7th Cir. 1993).
502
THE 1NISIBLE PERSON
2. Hypo # 2-An Example of Modem-Terry
On a routine police patrol of a neighborhood, two police officers spot
two suspicious men congregating on a street corner. The officers observe
the men and study their movements for approximately ten minutes. Upon
seeing an exchange of money for an obscured object, the police exit their
vehicle with guns drawn. The suspects immediately freeze in their
positions and do not attempt to resist or run. The officers request that the
men place their hands in the air and lay flat on their stomachs. The officers
place handcuffs on each of the suspects and isolate the individuals. While
handcuffed, the police place one suspect in the backseat of the police car
and the other remains handcuffed, face down on the pavement. One
officer, sitting in the front seat of the police car, starts to question the
suspect about his identity and the exchange. Ten minutes into the basic
questioning, the officer escalates his tone and continues to press matters the
suspect has stated he does not know. The officer persists and continues to
interrogate the suspect while he remains handcuffed in the back seat of the
police car. The officer never reads the suspect his Miranda rights.
Under Approach #1, this would be deemed a valid Terry stop because
the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop and
search of the suspect. Since this stop was initiated as a valid Terry stop, a
court following this approach would hold that the suspect is not in custody
within the meaning of Miranda, despite the fact that the suspect is
handcuffed in the backseat of a police car. Therefore, regardless of how
coercive the stop becomes, as long as it was valid at its initiation, it does
not constitute custody. However, under Approach #2, a court would likely
hold that while this stop may have been reasonable at its inception, it has
significantly moved into a more coercive realm, thus requiring Miranda
warnings to avoid a constitutional violation.
Finally, under the new approach, a court would likely determine that
while drawing weapons and handcuffing suspects are now commonly used
during Terry stops, given the circumstances, the police should have
provided the suspect with Miranda warnings. As a result of this expansion,
a Terry stop is now often scarcely distinguishable from a traditional
arrest. 139 Using this philosophy, a court could conclude that this stop
139 See Godsey, supra note 76, at 733 ("Terry stops-as a whole-have become much more
intrusive than they were just a few years ago. It is commonplace for these investigatory detentions to
involve handcuffs, drawn weapons . . . and other forms of force that used to be appropriate only for full-
scale arrests."); see also Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased
Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and Frisk," 50 OKLA. L. REv. 451, 452 (1997)
("[T]he line between a formal arrest and a Terry stop and frisk [has] become[] blurred. This blur is the
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significantly restricted the suspect's freedom of movement and forced him
to submit to coercive police pressures without rising to the level of a full-
blown arrest. Therefore, under this Note's approach, the police should
have read the suspect his Miranda rights before interrogating him.
D. The New Approach Is Better Equipped to Protect the Constitutional
Contours of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
The new approach, which advocates for a broader standard of custody, is
necessary since the current definition under Miranda has become
unworkable in light of the expansion of Terry.140 Since Terry was decided
in 1968, federal courts have authorized the use of handcuffs, brandishing
weapons, and holding suspects at gunpoint as permissible under Terry.141
Thus, what was never even contemplated under the original Terry decision
has become routine and acceptable. 142 While it is clear that Terry has
expanded beyond its original contours, a universal regimented method does
not exist for measuring when that stop rises to the level of an arrest.
A number of policy reasons support this Note's approach over the status
quo. First and foremost, a main policy concern is that there are endless
scenarios in which an individual's statements are obtained by law
enforcement under non-arrest, yet coercive, conditions. Police should be
prohibited from utilizing those statements in subsequent criminal
prosecutions, unless the suspect was fully informed of his or her rights.143
The approach advocated by this Note provides a standard that officers can
use to govern and adjust their own actions during a coercive Terry stop.
Courts will also be equipped with a principled basis to evaluate legal
challenges to coercive Terry stops.
Additionally, the benefits of requiring police to Mirandize suspects in
coercive, police-dominated environments outweigh any burden that such an
obligation places on police, as this requirement will provide tremendous
benefits to individuals' rights, as well as to this country's criminal justice
result of the lower courts expansion of the Terry decision . . . .").
140 See United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In the recent past, the ...
'permissible scope of the intrusion [under the Terry doctrine has] expanded beyond [its] original
contours."') (quoting United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990); see also United
States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The last decade ... has witnessed a multifaceted
expansion of Terry.").
141 See supra note 60.
142 See Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1223; see also United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 354-55 (6th Cir.
1986).
143 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966); see also Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199, 206 (1960).
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system. Miranda warnings should be viewed as a necessary safeguard, not
a burdensome impediment. Many legal scholars and authorities believe
that Miranda warnings are a powerful tool in professional police work
because the warnings force law enforcement officials to accumulate
scientific and legal evidence to build a solid case.144
Furthermore, numerous studies have suggested that suspects waive their
rights eighty to ninety percent of the time. 145 Therefore, requiring police to
issue Miranda warnings would not create obstacles for law enforcement,
nor would it impose a burden on police to conduct criminal investigations.
It would, however, reinforce the principles in the Fifth Amendment, adhere
to the basic tenets of Miranda, and provide a safeguard to protect suspects
from succumbing to police pressures and rendering self-incriminating
statements. Suspects may choose to waive their rights, but to strip
individuals of their ability to be informed of their rights should not be
permissible.
CONCLUSION
In the last two decades the lower federal courts have dramatically
increased the scope of permissible force that officers may use when
conducting a Terry stop.146 This trend has had a massive impact on Fourth
and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, and has sparked much debate about
Miranda custody and Terry stop detentions. 147 While some have embraced
the expansion of Terry as an effective way of protecting the safety of police
and ensuring efficiency in criminal investigations, it has significantly
impacted and intruded upon constitutionally protected rights. Circuit
courts have struggled to reconcile the conflicting judicial frameworks for
these two doctrines, which has resulted in mass confusion in this area of
144 See Alexander Nguyen, The Assault on Miranda, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Dec. 19, 2001,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the-assault-on miranda; see also Brief for The American
Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20-21, Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), available at http://supreme.1p.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/99-
5525/99-5525fo4/brief.pdf.
145 Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of
Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 212, 219 (2004); Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police
Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 259, 260 (1996).
146 See Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224; see also Godsey, supra note 76, at 716 (explaining that in the late
1980s and early 1990s, federal courts dramatically broadened the ambit of permissible force that police
may use during a Terry stop).
147 See E. Martin Estrada, Criminalizing Silence: Hiibel and the Continuing Expansion of the Terry
Doctrine, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 279, 285 (2005); see also Michael J. Roth, Berkemer Revisited:
Uncovering the Middle Ground Between Miranda and the New Terry, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2779, 2781(2009).
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criminal procedure.148
A main problem contributing to the confusion is that courts are trying to
figure out the correct test to determine "custody." However, as articulated
by this Note, the real issue is that the legal definition of custody needs to be
reworked to adequately align with the expansion of Terry.Federal courts
have invoked two distinct approaches to resolve this conundrum; however,
both of these approaches are flawed in that they fail to provide the
appropriate level of constitutional protection the Court envisioned when it
decided Miranda. Some courts rely on an untenable Supreme Court
precedent that no longer provides historically relevant or even accurate
guidance on the issue, while other courts have articulated the correct basic
legal framework, but fail to reach the right ultimate conclusion.149 This
Note has sought to develop an analytical framework to dispel the immense
uncertainty associated with the standard of custody. It is an attempt to
restore doctrinal consistency to stop, search, and interrogate jurisprudence.
Since the judicial system is often entrusted with the responsibility of
setting the boundaries for Terry and Miranda, courts need direction and
structure to create solid, constitutionally sound precedent. With that
objective in mind this Note seeks to propose a revised standard of custody
that has been expanded to parallel the expansion of the modem Terry
doctrine. Therefore, broadening the definition of custody will provide
necessary protection to suspects, given the liberal scope of Terry, while
also harmonizing the basic principles emphasized in Miranda.
148 See supra note 10 (demonstrating a circuit split regarding Terry stops and Miranda custody).
149 See supra Part I.
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